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Abstract 
 
Despite the considerable attention paid to the theory of tax incidence, there are 
surprisingly few estimates of the pass-through rate of sales taxes on retail prices.  
This paper estimates the effect of a suspension and subsequent reinstatement of the 
gasoline sales tax in Illinois and Indiana on retail prices.  Earlier laws set the timing 
of the reinstatements, providing plausibly exogenous changes in the tax rates.  Using 
a unique dataset of daily gasoline prices at the station level, retail gas prices are found 
to drop by 3% following the elimination of the 5% sales tax, and increase by 4% 
following the reinstatements, compared to neighboring states.  Some evidence also 
suggests that the tax reinstatements are associated with higher prices up to an hour 
into neighboring states, which provides some evidence on the size of the geographic 
market for gasoline.  Effects across different competitive environments are 
considered as well. 
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1. Introduction 
Gasoline prices are particularly visible, and when they spike there are often calls 
to reduce or eliminate gas taxes (Berryman, 2005).  State and federal taxes add forty 
cents to the average gallon of gasoline in the US, resulting in over $8 billion in tax 
receipts each year (EIA, 2005).  For a tax moratorium to reduce prices it is necessary to 
estimate the pass-through rate—the proportion of the tax paid by consumers—at least in 
the short run.     
 The theory of tax incidence has been well studied and suggests that sales and 
excise taxes should be fully passed onto consumers in competitive markets with constant 
marginal costs.1  Less than ‘full shifting’ is expected in markets with increasing marginal 
costs, while the pass-through rate may be less than, or greater than, one-hundred percent 
in markets that are less competitive.  In addition, tax increases in one state may lead to 
higher prices across the border as stations there face greater demand. 
Despite this attention paid to tax incidence, surprisingly little empirical work has 
estimated the effect of sales taxes on prices (Poterba, 1996; Besley and Rosen, 1999; 
Kenkel, 2005).  This paper studies a moratorium on gasoline sales taxes in Illinois and 
Indiana during the summer and fall of 2000 to estimate the effect of tax changes on retail 
prices, along with the effect on competition along the state borders.  Using a unique data 
set of daily prices at the gas-station level, linked with census and geographic data, prices 
are compared with neighboring states before and after the tax changes.   
The tax moratorium offers four main advantages.  First, the reinstatement of the 
gasoline tax in these states is an arguably exogenous change in the tax rate.  In Indiana 
the moratorium ended after 120 days as a result of a 1981 law that allowed the tax 
                                                 
1 Kotlikoff and Summers (1987) and Fullerton and Metcalf (2002) offer a detailed reviews. 
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suspension.  In Illinois, the tax repeal was set to expire at the potentially arbitrary time of 
the end of the year.  While the dates of the reinstatements were known and could have 
increased demand (and prices) just prior to the tax increases, the lack of a pre-existing 
trend in price differences across states at the time of the reinstatements suggests that the 
end of the tax suspensions provide plausibly exogenous changes in the tax rate.  Second, 
the repeal and subsequent reinstatements allow estimates of the pass-through rate for both 
decreases and increases in the tax.  Similar estimates of the effect of the tax on retail 
prices would suggest that the price changes are tied to the tax rate policies.  The 
comparisons also provide a test for asymmetry in the response to changes in stations’ 
marginal costs, as the downward price adjustment may be stickier than the upward 
adjustment (Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert, 1997).  Third, while the short-run nature 
of the policy change does not inform long-run effects, it does provide a way to study the 
extent of the geographic market for gasoline holding station locations fixed.   Fourth, 
gasoline is a homogeneous product where quality differences across space are minimized 
when studying the pass-through rate of sales taxes across retailers.  The key 
differentiation in the market would appear to be location, a subject we consider in detail 
below. 
The results suggest that retail gas prices drop by 3% following the elimination of 
the 5% sales tax, and increase by 4% following its reinstatement.  The tax increase in 
Indiana is associated with higher prices up to an hour away from its border, though the 
evidence is mixed for the Illinois reinstatement.  Cities and neighborhoods with different 
numbers of competitors were examined, and the results are fairly robust across market 
types.  Results are also similar across a number of robustness and specification checks.  
 4  
As a whole, the results suggest that pass-through rates are between sixty and eighty 
percent for retail gasoline in the short run. 
  The structure of the paper is as follows.  Section two briefly provides 
background on the reasons for the tax repeals and how they were conducted, as well as a 
review of the related literature to place the current results in context.  Section three 
describes the data and presents mean comparisons of ZIP code characteristics across the 
comparison groups.  Section four presents the empirical model and results.  A number of 
specification and robustness tests are also described.  Section five concludes. 
 
2.  Background and Related Literature 
In the spring of 2000, gasoline prices rose sharply in the Midwest.  Figure 1 
shows the average daily price of regular unleaded gasoline in Chicago, the rest of Illinois, 
Indiana, Kentucky, and the other states that are neighbors to Illinois and Indiana 
(Wisconsin, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio and Michigan).   Average prices spiked to $2.11 per 
gallon in Chicago, and $1.78 in Indiana on June 19, a very high, and politically 
unattractive, price at the time (though quite common in 2005).  The spike has been 
attributed to short supplies of refined gasoline in anticipation of a change in the 
reformulation required of refineries, along with unexpectedly high demand (FTC, 2001).  
Much was written about the increase in gasoline prices at the time, as evidenced by at 
least four reports investigating the cause of the price spikes including an investigation by 
the Federal Trade Commission (Conrad, Howard, and Noggle, 2000; Shore, 2000; 
Martin, 2001; FTC, 2001).   
 5  
In response, on June 20, 2000, the governor of Indiana used the power granted 
under a 1981 statute to declare an energy emergency, allowing him to suspend the five 
percent sales tax on gasoline for 60 days, with a possible extension for another 60 days.  
He announced that the suspension would begin on July 1st, with the sixty day timeframe.  
He later extended the suspension three times:  on August 22nd changing the end date to 
September 15th, on September 13th extending the suspension until September 30th, and on 
September 28th allowing the suspension to run its 120 day course.2    The excise tax that 
was tied to highway funding was not allowed to be suspended without legislative 
approval.   
In Illinois, the legislature responded by passing a bill on June 28th suspending its 
five percent sales tax on gasoline, set to begin on July 1st as well.  The moratorium in 
Illinois was set to end six months later on January 1, 2001.  Of the neighboring states, 
only Michigan had a sales tax to consider suspending, and while there was talk of a 
suspension it did not occur.    
 The effect of the repeal on gasoline taxes was questioned at the time.  While the 
Illinois law required gasoline retailers to post a notice that the gasoline tax had been 
suspended, the governor of Illinois, George Ryan, noted:  “There is no guarantee in a 
free-market economy that prices will go down, but I believe that the political and public 
pressure applied by the roll back of the sales tax will help force prices down.” (Ryan, 
2000).  A subsequent appraisal showed that prices had fallen following the tax 
                                                 
2 This was an election year in Indiana, and the governor was criticized for continuing the sales tax 
suspension in August and September when prices had already fallen (see Figure 1).  On October 25th, the 
governor made known that the sales tax would be ending.  State press releases noted that the sales tax 
would be reinstated at midnight on October 25th, but the clear jump in prices occurred at the 120 day mark 
from the time of the tax suspension.  Price differences between Indiana and neighboring states did not 
change on September 1st, 15th, or 30th.   The timing of the effect is discussed further below. 
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suspension, though the investigation did not attempt to disentangle the effect of the tax 
suspension with the falling wholesale prices at the time (Conrad, Howard, and Noggle, 
2000). 
Related Literature 
Poterba (1996) reviews the early empirical literature on sales tax incidence and 
argues that there has been relatively little empirical work on the incidence of sales taxes.3  
Further, the evidence has been mixed with regard to incomplete, full, and over shifting of 
taxes on retail prices.  Poterba (1996) analyzes city-specific clothing price indices for 
eight cities during 1947-77 and fourteen cities during 1925-39.  Retail prices rose by 
approximately the amount of the sales tax for the post-war period but only by two-thirds 
during the Depression years.  Besley and Rosen (1999) use quarterly data for 12 
commodities (such as bananas, bread, milk and Big Macs) in 155 cities during 1982-90.  
Their model includes city fixed effects to test the effect of changes in tax rates on retail 
prices.  While the pass-through rates for some commodities are estimated to be close to 
100%, their results also suggest that several commodities have what has been labeled 
overshifting:  pass-through rates of well over 100%.  Kenkel (2005) recently studies the 
effect of tax hikes on the price of alcoholic beverages in Alaska.  His interesting results 
suggest that alcohol taxes are more than fully passed through to beverage prices.   
In the case of gasoline prices, the prediction of the pass-through rate is 
ambiguous, as the market for retail gasoline is usually characterized as imperfectly 
competitive due to the spatially-differentiated nature of the market (Verlinda, 2004).  
Other factors that determine local market demand elasticity such as demography, 
                                                 
3 Early studies include Brown (1939), Due (1942) and Bishop (1968).  
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household income, and means of commuting are also likely to affect the pass-through 
rate. 
In terms of the empirical literature on gasoline taxation, Chouinard and Perloff 
(2002) used a monthly panel of the 48 US contiguous states and the District of Columbia 
between 1989 and 1997 to estimate a reduced-form model of gasoline prices. Among 
other results, they find that tax variations and market power (measured by mergers) 
contribute substantially to geographic price differentials.  Using a model with state fixed 
effects, they also find that 50% of federal tax incidence is passed on to consumers, 75% 
of state ad valorem taxes like those studied here are passed on to consumers, and nearly 
all of the state excise taxes are passed on to consumers.  Meanwhile, wholesale prices 
appear unaffected by changes in state tax rates.  In another paper, Chouinard and Perloff 
(2004) also find that state specific taxes fall almost entirely on consumers, especially in 
states that use relatively little gasoline and have lower elasticity of supply.  While the 
timing of the tax changes were not explored, the results are consistent with less than or 
full shifting of taxes in gasoline markets. 
Alm, Sennoga, and Skidmore (2005) also consider a panel of monthly gasoline 
prices for the fifty U.S. states and estimate the effect of changes in excise taxes on retail 
prices using a model with state fixed effects.  They find that the excise tax is fully passed 
on to consumers within the first month of a tax change, with no effect on retail prices of 
the one-month lag in the tax level.  This is consistent with the results presented below 
that comparisons just before and after the tax changes likely capture the full (if short-run) 
effects on retail prices.  The paper also notes the potential impact of spatial competition 
by comparing the results for urban versus rural states.  They find that the pass-through 
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rates are similar, though somewhat smaller in rural states where stations are thought to be 
more widespread.  In addition, they test whether prices respond differently to excise tax 
increases and decreases and do not find an asymmetry in the response.  Like the 
Chouinard and Perloff papers, the timing and potential endogeneity of the excise tax 
changes were not considered, and aggregate data precluded the study of the spatial effects 
of the tax changes at the station level. 
Our analytical framework follows the Chouinard and Perloff reduced form 
specification. The demand function for gasoline is given by Q = D(p, X), where p denotes 
the gas price and X represents exogenous demand shifters.  On the supply side, the 
reduced-form marginal cost function is MC(t, W), where t is the tax parameter and W 
represents cost shifters.  Profit maximization implies that the marginal cost of a firm 
equals its marginal revenue.  Therefore, we have p = f(t, X, W, Z), where Z consists of the 
variables that capture the market power of the firms, which in turn results in price being 
different from firms’ marginal revenue. 
 In the model, the effect of a tax increase on price also depends on demand 
conditions, cost structure and market power of the firms.  In a perfectly competitive 
market, we would expect that the tax would be completely passed through to the 
customer when the firms face constant marginal cost, while the pass-through rate is less 
than one when they have increasing marginal cost.  However, as pointed out by Katz and 
Rosen (1985) and Stern (1987), the ‘full tax shifting’ case cannot be generalized as the 
upper bound when the market is not perfectly competitive.  In that case, the pass-through 
rate of the tax could be either below or above 100%, depending on the elasticity of 
demand.  For example, in the case of isoelastic demand, the pass-through rate in a market 
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with an oligopoly is more than 100%, and will be still greater in monopolistic 
competition if the elasticity of demand is less than one. 
The gas tax repeal studied here may impact competition across state borders as 
well.  A decrease in the state tax rate may lower prices for that state’s drivers, as well as 
drivers from neighboring states if stations across the border are part of the same market.  
Previous evidence suggests that consumers should not be willing to travel very far 
to save on gasoline.  Manuszak and Moul (2005) use local tax differences to study the 
static trade-off between price and traveling.  Using data from the Chicagoland area 
(Chicago, Cook County, Will County and Northwest Indiana) in July 2001, they find that 
a typical Chicagoland consumer must save $0.55 per fill-up in order to travel to a station 
an additional mile away.  This suggests that traveling for cheaper gas prices is not cost 
effective.   
Nevertheless, the market size is likely reflected by commuting patterns.  
Commuters, and interstate commercial drivers, do not require additional travel to find 
lower prices.  These drivers may delay their purchase to find the station with cheaper 
prices along their routes and may extend the size of the market for gasoline.4  The 
analysis below considers the effect of the tax changes on competition across state 
borders, which will also provide some evidence on the appropriateness of using 
neighboring states as comparison groups. 
 There are other studies that look at cross-border competition in other industries. 
For example, Coats (1995) studies the effects of state cigarette taxes in the US and finds 
that about fourth-fifths of the sales response to state cigarette taxes is due to cross-border 
                                                 
4 The US Census metropolitan statistical areas are defined by commuting patterns for largely this reason.   
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sales.  Sumner (1981) and Ashenfelter and Sullivan (1987) also use cross-state 
differentials in cigarette excise tax to study the extent of market power in the industry.  
Further, the effects of a state’s spending policies on other states have been considered as 
well (see, for example, Case, Hines, and Rosen, 1993). 
The tax changes studied here may affect prices across time as well as across 
space.  For example, consumers may delay their purchase of gasoline just prior to the tax 
suspension, or increase their purchase of gasoline just prior to the tax reinstatements.  
This may lead to lower prices just prior to the suspension and higher prices prior to the 
reinstatement.  Such changes in prices are explored below. 
One advantage of the temporary nature of the suspension is that it allows a study 
of the extent of the geographic market for gasoline taking the location of the stations as 
given.  In equilibrium, differences in taxes across jurisdictions simultaneously determine 
not only the gas price in each station, but also dictate the location of the gas stations 
across geographic areas.  The temporary tax changes are not likely to change the location 
decisions of the station owners, or the decision for new stations to enter the market.  As a 
result, the effect of the tax changes should be reflected mainly in the gas prices, as they 
change the static trade-off between price and traveling costs across borders for gasoline.       
 
4.   Data Description 
The analysis uses a unique dataset of daily gasoline prices at the station level.  
These prices are collected by Wright Express Financial Services corporation, a leading 
provider of payment processing and financial services to commercial and government 
car, van and truck fleets in the United States.  Their Oil Price Information Service (OPIS) 
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provides wholesale and retail gasoline prices for up to 120,000 gasoline stations each 
day.  One advantage of the data is that measurement error should be minimized, as the 
prices are recorded electronically from their clients’ charge cards.5  Prices for regular 
unleaded are collected, along with wholesale prices from the nearest refinery that 
produces the formulation of gasoline used by the station.   
Figure 1 showed that the price spike was particularly severe in Chicago, and 
noticeably less so in Kentucky.  For greater comparability, the main analysis will exclude 
the Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL, IN, WI Metropolitan Statistical Area, as well as 
Kentucky, though the results are similar when these areas are included as discussed 
below.  Stations in Illinois, Indiana, and five neighboring states:  Michigan, Ohio, 
Missouri, Iowa, and Wisconsin are compared, where roughly 6,000 stations are surveyed 
each day.  The data has some missing days, however, especially on weekends and 
holidays.  For example, there are no observations during July 1- July 4, and few 
observations right at January 1.  Instead, the main analysis will focus on prices just before 
and after the tax changes as allowed by the data, using two days before and after to 
increase the number of stations observed.  For the July tax repeal, June 27 and 28 are 
compared to July 5 and July 6; October 26 and 27 are compared to October 31 and 
November 1 for the Indiana reinstatement; and relatively fewer observations for 
December 29 and 30 are compared to January 2 and 3 for the Illinois reinstatement.  
Specifications that consider longer time frames and flexible treatments for time variation 
are estimated as well.  
The OPIS data also include the street address of the station.  US Census of 
Population data at the ZIP code level in 2000 are used as controls for neighborhood 
                                                 
5 Further information on the methodology is available at http://opisnet.com/methodology.asp 
 12  
characteristics such as the age, race, and educational composition, median household 
income, population, and commuting behavior.  The US Gazetteer ZIP Code file from the 
US Census was collected, which includes the area of the ZIP code and its latitude and 
longitude.  In addition, the 2000 US Census ZIP Code Business Patterns database records 
the number of gasoline stations in each ZIP code, which will be used as a control on the 
local competitive environment.  Maps were used to identify those ZIP codes with an 
interstate highway as a measure of access to gasoline stations that are effectively closer in 
terms of travel times.   
The address data also allows an estimate of the distance from the station to the 
state border.  First, ZIP codes that comprise the state borders were identified using ZIP 
code maps.  Then, for stations in Illinois/Indiana, the minimum driving distance in 
minutes from each ZIP code to a neighboring state ZIP code was calculated using 
software from Mapquest™.  This data source has the advantage of calculating distances 
as consumers would travel from one area to the next, as opposed to distances calculated 
along a straight line.  For stations in the neighboring states, the distance from each station 
to the nearest Illinois or Indiana ZIP code is also calculated.  This allows a comparison of 
stations near the Illinois/Indiana border, as well as those farther from the border, to test 
the effect of the Illinois/Indian tax changes on stations in neighboring states. 
One potential limitation of the pricing data is that it may oversample stations used 
by consumers who travel extensively.  The coverage appears fairly complete in the 
Midwest, however.  When comparing stations in the pricing survey and those in the 
Census data, the median ZIP code had three quarters of the stations surveyed.  Further, 
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the surveyed stations include many unbranded gasoline stations, and over a third of the 
stations surveyed are in ZIP codes with no interstate.6 
Table 1 describes the variables used as controls and demonstrates that the 
comparison groups are similar.  The sample considered is for the July tax repeals.  The 
differences are statistically significant given the large number of observations, but the 
neighborhoods are fairly similar.  For example, the Illinois/Indiana ZIP codes have 
median household incomes are $42,000 versus $43,000 in the neighboring states.  The 
commuting patterns were computed for all workers in each ZIP code, and stations in both 
comparison groups are located in ZIP cods with an average of 82% of workers who drive 
to work alone and commute times in minutes that are nearly identical.  The population is 
somewhat smaller in the Illinois/Indiana ZIP codes (19,000 versus 21,000).  Another 
difference is in terms of average gas prices:  retail prices were ten cents cheaper in 
Indiana/Illinois, partly because prices had declined already prior to the moratorium.  
Wholesale prices, meanwhile, were four cents cheaper per gallon.  One reason for the 
similarity in the ZIP codes is the exclusion of Chicagoland.  When stations in the Chicago 
MSA were included, the Illinois/Indiana ZIP codes tended to have much higher gasoline 
prices, were more urban, higher income, younger, and more likely to have residents using 
public transportation.   
 
5.  Empirical Model and Results 
                                                 
6 To explore the types of ZIP codes that have better coverage in the pricing sample, the ZIP code count of 
the number of stations in the sample was regressed on the observable characteristics in Table 1.  The main 
result is that more populous ZIP codes are associated with more stations surveyed, even after controlling 
for the number of stations in the Census data. 
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All results in the paper are presented with respect to three time periods:  the 
summer of 2000 when stations in Illinois/Indiana are compared to neighboring states; the 
fall of 2000 when Indiana is compared to its neighboring states including Illinois; and the 
winter of 2000/2001 when Illinois is compared to its neighboring states including 
Indiana.   
The main results are in Figure 2, which reports the results of a local linear 
regression of the difference in average log retail prices between Illinois/Indiana and 
neighboring states against time.  These models were separately estimated before and after 
the tax changes, and the size of the discontinuity at the time of the tax change is a 
difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of the tax change on retail prices.7 
Figure 2A reports the results for the summer of 2000.  One feature is the 
downward trend in the difference in gas prices prior to the moratorium.  Recall that there 
was a spike in the spring of 2000, and the legislation appears to be dealing with a 
problem that was already ameliorating—a chief criticism of the tax changes (Martin, 
2001).  This pre-reform trend in price differences suggests that the difference-in-
difference estimate may reflect other changes in the market, and may overstate the effect 
of the tax change on retail prices—the price differences may have declined without the 
tax change.  The difference does appear to level off prior to the tax change, however, and 
the difference-in-difference estimate implied by the local linear regressions is a reduction 
                                                 
7 Results shown have a bandwidth of 7 days.  Results are slightly smaller with a bandwidth of 14 days, with 
difference in difference estimates of -1.8%, 4.1%, and 2.0%.  OLS estimates with flexible time frames are 
discussed below. 
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in retail prices of 2.7 log points, or approximately 2.7%, following the suspension of the 
5% sales tax.8   
Figures 2B and 2C compare the differences in retail prices against time when the 
gas taxes are reinstated.  The pre-reform differences in prices are much flatter than the 
July comparison when the reform was reacting to market conditions, suggesting that the 
sunset provisions provide plausibly exogenous changes in the tax rate.  The effect appears 
to fade somewhat thirty days after the reform at the end of November, but this is due to a 
temporary increase in retail prices in Illinois not experienced by Indiana or its other 
neighboring states.  Meanwhile, a slight decline in relative prices is found in the last 
week of December (-0.4%) that continues in the first week of January (-0.7%).  
While the end dates were not chosen to reflect concerns about market conditions, 
the announced end date may affect purchasing habits prior to the tax increase.  If demand 
increased just prior to the tax increase, the price would be expected to rise as well, though 
this is not observed in the data.  This suggests that the comparison of prices before and 
after the reform provide a useful estimate of the effect of the tax change on retail prices. 
The local linear regression estimates suggest that Indiana’s retail price increased 
by 4% relative to neighboring states at the time of the 5% tax increase, while Illinois’s 
retail price rose by 2.8% at the time of its reinstatement.   
These raw comparisons do not take into account differences between 
Illinois/Indiana and neighboring states, including potential differences in wholesale prices 
                                                 
8 The distinct jump in prices suggests that the effects happened right away, as opposed to consumers 
increasing demand just before the tax increases, or stations reacting slowly over time.  In terms of the 
stations’ responses, an S-shape in the jump would be expected if some stations responded immediately 
while others waited (Caballero et al., 1995).  Responses by day are considered in more detail below. 
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changes.  To test the effect of the tax changes on retail prices controlling for these factors, 
the following model is estimated for station s selling brand b at time t: 
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where 1(Illinois or Indiana)s is an indicator that the station is in Illinois or Indiana for the 
July time period, Indiana for the October comparison, and Illinois for the January 
comparison;  Post Reformt is an indicator that the gas price is observed after the tax 
change; and Xs is a vector of the station’s ZIP code characteristics described in Table 1. 
Brand fixed effects are also included, as decisions at the brand level may affect 
the reaction of prices to the change in taxes.9  One issue is that brands primarily in one 
state will be nearly collinear with the indicator for Illinois or Indiana.  As a result, the 
indicators for major brands that make up at least five percent of the station observations 
in both the treatment and comparison groups are included.  These major-brand stations 
account for 60% of the observations.  Results are nearly the same when brand fixed 
effects for all stations are included while restricting the data to those brands observed in 
both comparison groups, but including the indicators for only the major brands allows the 
use of all the stations. 
Table 2 reports the results of models with and without controls.  Again, the 
estimates are broken into three time periods:  just before and after July 1, October 31, and 
January 1.  Column (1) includes no controls and retail prices are estimated to fall by 
roughly 3.5% in July, and increase by 3.9% in October and 2.7% in January.  These 
estimates imply pass-through rates of 70%, 78%, and 54%, respectively. 
                                                 
9 Hastings (2004) studied the conversion of independent gasoline stations into branded gasoline stations 
and found evidence of consumer brand loyalty which can affect the price response to the tax changes. 
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Column (2) includes the wholesale price which serves to control for differential 
changes in the costs of the stations at the time of the reform. (The potential effect of the 
tax reform on wholesale prices is explored below.)  The estimates decrease to 2.9% in 
July, remain about the same in October at 4.0%, and increase in January to 3.6%.   
The neighborhood characteristics may differ across the comparison groups as 
well, which may affect the response to shocks at the time of the reform.  When the 
control variables listed in Table 1 and brand indicators are included, the results are 
essentially unchanged as shown in Column (3).  This confirms the conclusion of Table 1 
that the Illinois and Indiana neighborhoods are similar to those in the neighboring states, 
especially with the exclusion of Chicagoland, as well as the ability of the difference-in-
difference estimate to control for time invariant differences across the comparison 
groups. 
The results are similar to the response of retail prices to wholesale price changes.  
When data from all of the states considered here from April 1, 2000 to March 31, 2001 
were considered, a 5% increase in a station’s wholesale price is associated with a 3% 
increase in its retail price.  This estimate was stable to the inclusion of control variables 
and station fixed effects.   
The point estimates are also consistent with an asymmetry in response to marginal 
costs increases versus decreases (Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert, 1997).  While the 
equality of response to the repeal and subsequent reinstatements of the tax cannot be 
rejected, the point estimates do suggest that the fall in prices is somewhat smaller than the 
increase in response to tax changes. 
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Of the control variables, the signs of the associations are generally as expected 
(see Appendix Table A1 for complete results).  For example, log wholesale prices are 
positively associated with log retail prices.  Income is positively associated with prices, 
possibly reflecting demand and cost of land.  The fraction of the ZIP code workers who 
carpool is positively associated with gasoline prices, likely reflecting the decision to 
carpool both in high gas price areas and around congested cities again with high land 
costs.  Last, the fraction of workers with long commutes is negatively associated with 
retail prices in July and January, possibly as they increase the number of competitors to 
include gasoline stations along the major commuting routes.   
Wholesale Prices 
The previous discussion has restricted attention to the retail gasoline market and 
controls for wholesale prices in an attempt to compare stations with similar marginal 
costs.  If wholesale prices were affected by the tax reforms then the difference-in-
difference estimates would be affected as well.  For example, in July when wholesale 
prices and taxes are falling at the same time, the estimates would be smaller in absolute 
value as the wholesale price control variable soaked up some of the effect of the reform.  
Table 2 showed that the estimate did decrease in July when the wholesale price control 
was introduced, though the estimates were stable in October and increased in January.   
Column (4) of Table 2 further investigates the effect of the tax reforms on 
wholesale prices.  The model is similar to those above, but with log wholesale price as 
the dependent variable.  The difference-in-difference estimates reveal small decreases in 
wholesale prices at the time of the tax changes, including a 1.4% drop in January at the 
time of the Illinois reinstatement compared to its neighboring states.  The lack of a 
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significant effect of sales tax changes on wholesale prices suggests that they can serve as 
controls for differential costs across the comparison groups.  The result is also consistent 
with the prior estimates that the tax incidence does not seem to pass on to wholesalers in 
the market for gasoline (Chouinard and Perloff, 2004). 
Competition across Borders 
One question that arises when using neighboring states as a comparison group is 
whether or not they were affected by the reforms in Illinois and Indiana.  The effect of the 
tax change on border competition can also yield insights into cross-border tax incidence 
and the extent of the geographic market for gasoline.  If the border stations, consumers 
along the border, and drivers commuting across the border respond to the tax change, we 
would expect smaller difference-in-difference estimates at the border.  The stations in the 
treated states would be under less pressure from the cross-border competitors to pass 
along the tax savings, and the stations just across the border would be under more 
pressure to match any price declines. 
To test the effect of the tax change at different distances from the border, stations 
were categorized by their distance in five minute intervals from the Illinois/Indiana 
border (0-5 minutes, 5-10 minutes, and so on).  For stations in Illinois or Indiana, this is 
the traveling time to the nearest border (including Kentucky), while for the neighboring 
states this is the distance to the nearest tax reform state.  For example, the distance 
recorded for stations in Michigan is the distance to Indiana, while the distance recorded 
for a station in Indiana is the minimum distance to any neighboring state.  Note that, for 
the July comparison, Illinois and Indiana are treated as one treated region, so the Illinois-
Indiana border is omitted from the calculation.   Some cells had few observations, so the 
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analysis was restricted to cells with at least 10 stations in each of the comparison groups.  
This results in few observations far from the border, especially in January.   
In each of these cells, the average before-after price difference was calculated 
separately for Illinois/Indiana stations and the set of stations in neighboring states.  The 
difference between these price changes was then calculated for each five-minute interval 
from the Illinois/Indiana border.     
Figure 3 presents a local linear regression of these price changes against distance 
from the Illinois/Indiana border. 10  The horizontal axes in each of the panels are the five-
minute intervals from the border.  One regression shows the difference in average log 
retail prices before and after the reform in Illinois/Indiana; a second shows the before-
after difference in the neighboring states; and the third is the difference between these 
two, representing the difference-in-difference estimate comparing stations that are a 
similar distance from the Illinois/Indiana state borders. 
In July, the raw data provide little evidence of an effect on border competition, 
with larger difference-in-difference estimates (in absolute value) closer to the border.  
Not controlling for other observable characteristics, the price drops roughly 14 percent in 
the Illinois/Indiana region after the reform regardless of distance to the borders.  In the 
neighboring states, the prices drop roughly 10 percent seventy minutes and more from the 
border, though less of a decline is seen closer to the tax reform states.  This leads to a 
difference-in-difference estimate that varies from -7% at the border to -5% farther from 
the border.  
For the reinstatements, the raw comparisons do reveal smaller difference-in-
difference estimates closer to the border.  In October, the price increase in Indiana is not 
                                                 
10 The estimates use a bandwidth of twenty minutes representing four five-minute cells. 
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related to distance to the border, although the neighboring states have smaller price 
declines near the border compared to stations farther from the treated states.  The 
estimated difference-in-difference therefore increases from 3.7% at the border to an 
estimated 6.9% ninety minutes from the border, dropping to 5.3% one hundred twenty-
five minutes from the border.  The large decline at the very end of Figure 2B is partly due 
to few observations that far from the border in Indiana.   
In January, the raw data are again somewhat mixed:  smaller difference-in-
difference estimates are found near the border, but the estimates also decline for when 
comparing stations far from the border.  While the estimates in July and October had cells 
with generally over one hundred stations, the January comparison employs cells with 
generally less than fifty stations, especially farther from the border where cells are 
typically close to twenty stations.  The decline in the effect far from the border in 
January, therefore, should be treated with some caution.     
One way around the lack of data is to collapse the five-minute intervals into 
thirty-minute intervals.  In addition, the unconditional comparisons in Figure 3 do not 
take account of potential differences in observable characteristics, such as wholesale 
prices or the commuting behavior of residents across space that may affect the results.  
Table 3 reports estimates for a model that considers four regions defined by thirty minute 
intervals.  Stations over an hour and a half from the border, for example, are stations 
within an oval-shaped region in the center of the treated states.  For the untreated states, 
this is an indicator that the stations are simply far from the treated states. 
The models include the same specification as before, but now include the three-
way interaction between each of the three distance categories, 1(Illinois or Indiana), and 
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Post Reform.  The indicators for each distance category and their two-way interactions 
with 1(Illinois or Indiana), and Post Reform are also included.  The excluded category in 
Table 3 is less than thirty minutes from the border, and the first row reports the 
difference-in-difference estimate for this group:  -3.5% in July, 3.2% in October, and 
2.8% in January.  Although the preliminary look at the raw data discussed above suggests 
smaller estimates for stations farther from the border in July comparison, this is not the 
case when the models with full controls are considered.  The effect is slightly larger at 
thirty to sixty minutes away where summing the coefficient on IL/IN*Post and 
IL/IN*Post*1(>=30minutes and <60minutes) reveals a larger difference-in-difference 
estimate of -4.2%.  The effect drops slightly at sixty to ninety minutes away from the 
border (-3.6%), and is smaller still at stations even farther away from the border (-2.4%).  
None of these differences across distance categories are statistically significant, however. 
In October, the effect found in the raw data is present when controlling for 
observable characteristics:  a difference-in-difference estimate of 3.2% at the border, 
remaining flat at 3.3% between thirty minutes and one hour from the border, but 
increasing to 4.3% over an hour away from the border.  These differences are statistically 
significantly different and represent pass-through estimates increasing from 64% to 86%. 
In January, the shape of the effect found in the raw data is again evident in the 
model with controls, with smaller treatment effects at the border, large treatment effects 
sixty to ninety minutes from the border, and smaller effects for stations far from the 
border.  This decline in the effect far from the border was unexpected and may reflect the 
fact that the stations very far from the borders in the comparison states and the stations in 
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the very middle of Illinois are less comparable.  Again, the January results should be 
taken with some caution given the relatively smaller sample sizes. 
Another way to consider border competition is to consider whether the difference-
in-difference estimates are smaller when stations directly across the border from one 
another are compared.  Table 4 considers such stations by considering Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) that overlap state borders, and all stations along the treated state 
borders.  MSAs are defined by commuting patterns, which may provide a reasonable 
market definition for gasoline consumers. 
Column (1) considers Chicagoland, which, up to now, has been excluded from the 
analysis due to the lack of comparability among ZIP code characteristics and the size of 
the price spike that led to the tax repeal.  When stations within the Chicago-Naperville-
Joliet, IL-IN-WI, Metropolitan Statistical Area are considered for July, the model 
compares stations in Chicago and Gary, IN, with stations just across the 
Illinois/Wisconsin state border.  Only three percent of the stations are in the comparison 
group, but the estimate suggests a 2.7% decline in prices in the treated stations relative to 
the Wisconsin stations—similar to the estimate found in the larger sample.  In the 
October and January comparisons, there are more stations in the comparison groups:  
86% in October and 14% in January.  The estimated effect is much smaller in October 
(0%) when stations largely in Gary, IN, are compared to Chicago and Wisconsin stations 
within Chicagoland.  The estimate is somewhat smaller in January (2.7%) when Chicago 
stations are compared to the Wisconsin and Indiana stations.  The smaller effects found 
when the tax was reinstated may reflect differences in the comparison groups, but are 
also consistent with smaller treatment effects at the border. 
 24  
The other border MSAs in July are St. Louis (MO-IL), Cincinnati (OH-IN), South 
Bend (IN-MI), Jackson (MO-IL), Davenport (IA-IL), and Burlington (IA-IL).11  For 
stations in these overlapping MSAs, a similar model to those presented in Table 2 was 
estimated with MSA fixed effects.  These models use within-MSA variation in the tax 
regimes and retail prices to estimate the effect of the tax reforms on retail prices.  Table 4 
shows that the difference-in-difference estimate is larger in July (-3.6%), slightly larger in 
October (4.2%), but smaller in January (1.5%).  These estimates provide mixed evidence 
that the difference-in-difference estimates are indeed smaller near the border.   
A third way to consider the border competition is to compare stations that are just 
across the border from one another.  To estimate these effects, stations in Illinois/Indiana 
that are not in a border ZIP code were excluded, as well as stations outside 
Illinois/Indiana that are more than thirty minutes from the border.  To compare the 
estimates to the main results, Chicagoland is also excluded.  Then, an indicator for the 
“treated-state ZIP code” was created, which is the ZIP code for a station in 
Illinois/Indiana, and the nearest Illinois/Indiana ZIP code for stations outside of 
Illinois/Indiana.  Table 4 presents estimates of models similar to those presented in Table 
2, but with treated-state ZIP code fixed effects.  The estimates are again larger in July (-
5.6%), but smaller in October (3.1%) and January (1.3%).  While the evidence is again 
somewhat mixed in terms of the larger effects for July and smaller effects for October 
and January, the reinstatements suggest smaller difference-in-difference estimates for 
stations that compete along the border compared to stations farther from the border. 
                                                 
11 In order to compare the results with previous estimates in Table 2, we do not include the MSAs along the 
Kentucky border in this analysis. 
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Overall, the results on distance suggest smaller difference-in-difference results 
when analyzed close to the border, especially for the reinstatements.  This is consistent 
with the effect of the tax extending across state borders.  The October results appear to be 
more stable given the relatively larger sample size in October, and the lack of a major 
driving holiday that may affect the results.  These estimates suggest at 3.2% increase at 
the border and a 4.3% increase farther from the border.  The effect of the tax on retail 
prices for stations continues to suggest effects on retail prices of between 3% and 4% 
following the suspension and reinstatement of the 5% sales tax.     
Competitive Environment 
Another way the pass-through rates can differ is when the market conditions 
differ.  The temporary nature of the moratorium implies that it should not affect the 
structure of the market.  To the extent entry barriers are low, each market may be 
competitive, whereas zoning regulations may result in high barriers in some locations.  
One caveat is that the number of stations likely reflects population density as well, so it is 
important to control for population and area while investigating any relationship between 
number of stations and the price response to the tax changes.   
Table 5 considers how the difference-in-difference estimates vary across different 
types MSAs and ZIP codes defined by the number of gasoline stations.  The comparison 
is how geographic areas with many gasoline stations in the treated states respond to the 
tax change relative to areas with similar numbers of gasoline stations in the neighboring 
states to control for common trends that may differ by market structure.  MSAs were 
chosen as they reflect commuting patterns and may reflect the geographic market, while 
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ZIP codes may reveal differences if markets are much smaller.  Results were similar 
when only the treated states were considered.   
The results suggest little relationship between the number of stations and the 
response to the tax change, with a smaller effect found for MSAs with more stations in 
July and January, but a larger effect found for October.  Panel A reports the coefficient on 
the interaction between the natural logarithm of the number of gasoline stations reported 
to the Census bureau, an indicator for Illinois/Indiana, and an indicator for Post reform.  
The models also include the main effects as well as two-way interactions between these 
variables.  The first three columns consider the MSA level and the data are restricted to 
stations within MSAs, where the average MSA has 544 stations.  The estimates suggest 
that a doubling of the number of stations decreases the size of the price decline in July by 
0.5 percentage points, an increase in the effect of the tax increase in November (by 0.4 
percentage points), and an imprecisely estimated but small decrease in January (by 0.1 
percentage points).  At the ZIP code level, similar estimates are found in July and 
October, though the effect is found to be larger in January with an increase in stations (by 
0.7 percentage points).   
To explore the idea that the effect may not be log-linear in the number of stations, 
panel B breaks the samples into quartiles based on the number of stations.  Estimates are 
reported for the interaction between IL/IN and Post reform, representing the difference-
in-difference estimate for the excluded quartile:  areas with the fewest numbers of 
stations.  The three-way interactions of IL/IN, Post Reform, and the top three quartiles 
are reported to measure the difference in the estimated effect of the tax reform as the 
number of stations increase.  In July, the average number of stations in each quartile was 
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36, 113, 441, and 1307 for the MSA comparison and 2, 7, 12, and 20 for the ZIP code 
categories.   
The results largely mirror the results in Panel A.  In July, the number of stations in 
the MSA is not related to the price response until the top quartile, when the estimated 
effect becomes much smaller.  It should be noted, however, that only 5% of the stations 
in the top quartile are in the treated states in July.  The October reinstatement is 
associated with an increasing effect with the number of stations, while the January 
reinstatement is associated with a slight rise and fall of the effect with the number of 
stations.  At the ZIP code level, no relationship with the number of stations is found in 
July or October, while the January reinstatement suggests a rise in the estimated effect in 
the third quartile. 
The mixed results, coupled with the size of the estimated effects, suggest that the 
earlier results are fairly robust to the type of market considered.  If markets with many 
stations are thought to be competitive, then the robustness of the results across markets 
with different numbers of stations is consistent with gasoline markets requiring only a 
few stations to be as competitive as those with many more stations.   
Another way market sizes can differ is access to an interstate highway, as ease of 
travel may increase the number of competitors.  Stations far from an interstate may face 
less elastic consumers who cannot quickly get to other stations or delay purchase, and 
supply may be less elastic as well given the potentially narrower market. The result on 
pass-through is therefore ambiguous, and the empirical results can provide some insight 
into which effect may dominate.  When ZIP codes with an Interstate highway were 
compared to ZIP codes without an interstate, the results are mixed, however.  The effect 
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of the tax change on prices is found to be 1 percentage point larger in July for the stations 
far from an interstate, no difference in October, and 1 percentage point smaller in 
January, though all three differences were not statistically significantly different.12   
Last, differences in demand may impact the price response to the tax changes.  To 
test for these differences, ZIP codes were broken into two groups according to the median 
household income.  The average income level in the bottom half of ZIP codes is roughly 
$34,000, while the average ZIP code in the top half has an income level of $51,000.  
Higher income consumers may be less elastic, and the pass through may be larger as a 
result.  The results provide mild evidence that the pass-through increases with income 
level, with the effect of the reform on prices relatively flat with respect to income in July, 
the effects were found to be 0.5 percentage points higher in the wealthier ZIP codes in 
October and January.  Taken together, the results appear similar across different types of 
neighborhoods. 
Specification Checks 
 The previous results suggest that the effect of the tax changes on retail prices are 
fairly robust across increases and decreases in the tax rate, across different types of ZIP 
codes, and across space with smaller effects at the border.  Table 6 provides additional 
tests that suggest the main results are robust to the choice of sample and estimators.   
Spatial Autocorrelation 
So far the standard errors have been clustered at the state level to provide 
conservative estimates.  Another approach would be to directly model the spatial 
autocorrelation in the data.  Using the latitude and longitude of each station’s ZIP code, it 
                                                 
12 One caveat in these results is that the interstate runs through these ZIP codes, but there may not be an exit 
within the ZIP code.   
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is possible to describe the stations according to a distance grid.  The standard errors can 
then be estimated using a two-dimensional spatial autocorrelation structure set out in 
Conley (1999).13  Column (1) reports the results when a model of retail prices that 
controls for wholesale prices (as in the second column of Table 2) is estimated and the 
standard errors are corrected for spatial autocorrelation.14  The results show that the 
standard error estimates are fairly robust to the estimation method, with estimates that are 
slightly smaller than the clustered standard errors for July and slightly larger in January.  
Meanwhile, in October the estimates reveal some instability in the estimation as the 
standard errors become unrealistically small. 
Expanded Timeframe 
One issue with the above analysis is that it focused on the days just before and 
just after the reform, similar to an event study.15  This was justified in part by the lack of 
pre-existing trends in the price differences shown in Figure 2.  Another way to test the 
robustness of this approach is to examine a longer timeframe.  Column (2) of Table 6 
reports the results of models that include data from one month before and one month after 
the tax changes as in Figure 2.  The models include the full controls, as well as quadratic 
trends allowed to vary across comparison groups before and after the tax changes.  The 
time trend is centered at the reform date so that the coefficient on the interaction between 
the Illinois/Indiana indicator and the post-reform indicator provides the difference-in-
                                                 
13 The correction calls for cutoffs after which the information is no longer incorporated into the correction.  
The estimates presented here used two times the standard deviation of latitude/longitude degrees in the 
data.   
14 When the full set of controls is included, the estimated standard errors become much smaller.  The more 
parsimonious specification here provides estimates that are closer to the conservative ones presented 
throughout the paper. 
15 The estimates here used prices observed two days before and after the tax reforms to increase the number 
of stations observed, especially for the January comparison where many stations were not observed during 
the holiday season.  When one day before and after the reforms were considered, the estimates were smaller 
in July (-2.0%), similar in October (3.7%), and slightly larger in January (4.3%). 
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difference estimate at the time of the reform.  The result in July is fairly similar, a 3.3% 
decline at the time of the tax change.  A smaller increase is found in October (3.2%), 
while the change is slightly larger in January (4.2%).  The results hinge on the way time 
trends are controlled and there is a risk of overfitting that can contaminate the 
comparison.  When linear trends are used instead of linear and quadratic, the coefficient 
estimates are -1.2% in July, 4.4% in October, and 0.8% in January.  The main results are 
between these linear and quadratic results, and, given the lack of pre-existing trends in 
the October and January retail price differences, it appears that the short-window results 
presented earlier are fairly robust.   Meanwhile, the July results that appear most sensitive 
to the pre-existing trends in Figure 2 are actually similar when quadratic time trends and 
the full set of controls are included. 
Another way to be more flexible regarding timeframes is to consider data ten days 
before and ten days after the reforms, with indicators for each day to trace out the effect 
over time.  Table 2A in the appendix displays the results for a model that includes 
indicators for each day (excluding the day before the tax change).  The model includes a 
Post Reform indicator which can be interpreted as the change in price after the reform, 
while the post-reform daily indicators represent the difference from the first day after the 
reform.  The estimates at the time of the reform are smaller in July (-2.2%), similar in 
October (3.7%), and larger in January (4.6%).  The differences appear stable before and 
after the reforms, especially within one week of the reforms.  No increase in price is seen 
just prior to the reinstatements, which may have been expected given the potential for an 
increase in demand.  A drop in the effect is seen after day nine of the tax reinstatement in 
Indiana, though this appears to be a temporary drop when later data are considered.  
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Meanwhile, the effect in January is found to fade somewhat over the ten days after the 
reform, though again this is temporary as suggested by Figure 2.   
The last column in Table 6 reports the results including Chicago and Kentucky in 
the analysis.  Not surprisingly given the Chicago MSA results in Table 4, the results are 
somewhat smaller with the larger sample.  The results are qualitatively similar, however, 
with estimates of -2.5%, 3.2%, and 3.3%.  While the pre-existing trends and mean 
comparisons reflect a better comparison when these two areas are excluded, the results 
are largely robust when they are included. 
Over the many estimates, the October results appear to be more stable as they do 
not have a major driving holiday at the same time as the reform.  One way to consider 
whether holidays always have a differential effect in Illinois/Indiana compared to the 
neighboring states is to consider a difference-in-difference estimate just before and after 
Memorial Day when no tax policy change was in effect.  When this was estimated no 
effect was found (a coefficient of 0.003).  Another way to consider the effect of the July 
4th and January 1st holidays is to consider whether other states see differential price 
changes across state borders.  To test this idea, models were estimated similar to those in 
Table 2, but for gas stations in Pennsylvania and New York.  To mimic those results that 
exclude Chicago, New York City was excluded from the comparison.  Cross-border 
differences in retail prices are close to zero when these two “untreated” states are 
compared with estimates of -0.6%, 0.1%, and -0.2% for July 1, October 31, and January 
1, respectively.16 
                                                 
16 The lack of difference between NY and PA remains when NYC is included, with estimates of -0.8%, 
0.1%, and -0.1% in July, October, and January, respectively. 
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Other dates that may show a difference are September 1st, September 15th, and 
September 30th:  the dates the Indiana reform was set to expire prior to the Governor’s 
extensions.  No difference is found for these dates, with difference-in-difference 
estimates of 0.2%, -0.9%, and 0.3%, respectively.  Last, the Indiana press announced that 
the end of the suspension would be October 25th, but Figure 2 and Table A2 show that 
there was no change in retail prices at that time.  The jump in price occurs at the 120 day 
mark allowed for by law, suggesting that this is when the tax change went into effect. 
A final specification check considers the comparisons of Illinois and Indiana 
separately for the July suspensions.  Retailers in the two states may have reacted 
differently to the reform due to other regulations in place, such as the Illinois mandate 
that stations alert consumers to the sales tax repeal.  When Illinois versus Wisconsin, 
Iowa, and Missouri is considered, the difference-in-difference estimate is -3.1% for July 
and 3.6% for January.  Similarly, for the Indiana versus Michigan and Ohio comparison, 
the difference-in-difference estimates are -2.7% and 4.5%.  These specification checks 
suggest that the results are not very sensitive to the treatment of time, the influence of 
holidays, and the choice of comparison states. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
When gasoline prices spike, governments are under some pressure to respond to 
the volatility by cutting taxes.  Illinois estimates that the state lost $157 million in tax 
revenue (Noggle, 2005), while Indiana estimates a loss of $46 million (Nass, 2000).  One 
question is how much of a reduction in retail prices did the tax suspension buy?  Further, 
despite a great deal of attention paid to the incidence of taxation, surprisingly few 
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empirical studies of the pass-through rates of sales taxes have been conducted.  Using a 
unique dataset of gasoline station prices, and a plausibly exogenous change in tax rates, it 
is possible to estimate the effect of a tax change on gasoline prices, at least in the short 
run. 
 The estimates here suggest that the suspension of the 5% sales tax led to decreases 
in retail prices of 3% compared to neighboring states.  When the tax was reinstated, retail 
prices rose by roughly 4%.  The reinstatement estimates are particularly compelling given 
that the timing of the reinstatement was not based on market conditions, but rather a 1981 
law in the case of Indiana, and the end of the calendar year in the case of Illinois. 
The results also suggest that the difference-in-difference estimates are smaller 
when stations across the border from one another are considered.  These estimated 
differences increase up to approximately one hour from the state border, suggesting that 
competitive pressures may extend that far into neighboring states.  In particular, when the 
October reinstatement is considered, which has relatively more stations observed and no 
major holiday to affect the results, the retail prices are found to increase by 3% at the 
border and 4% for stations more than an hour from the border.  These results also suggest 
that stations in the neighboring states, particularly those farther from the state border, 
provide a useful comparison group to test the effect of the tax changes on retail prices.  
 Little association was found between the number of gasoline stations in the city or 
ZIP code and the effect of the tax change on prices.  If areas with many gasoline stations 
are thought to be competitive, then this result is consistent with gasoline markets 
requiring only a few gas stations to be competitive.   
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 Meanwhile, the differences in prices across comparison groups are found to be 
stable prior to the tax reinstatements, consistent with the timing of the reinstatements 
providing a plausibly exogenous change in the tax rate.  The effects are fairly robust 
across different types of ZIP codes, time periods, and comparison states, and suggest pass 
through rates of between 60 and 80%. 
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Figure 1:  Retail Gasolline Prices in Midwest: 
April 2000-April 2001
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Figure 2C: Winter 2000/2001 Difference in Log Gas Prices 
IL vs. Neighboring States: MO, IA, WI, IN 
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Figure 2B: Fall 2000 Difference in Log Gas Prices 
IN vs. Neighboring States: MI, OH, IL
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Figure 2A: Summer 2000 Difference in Log Gas Prices 
IL/IN vs. Neighboring States: MI, OH, MO, IA, WI
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Figure 3A:  Change in Retail Price:  July
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Figure 3C:  Change in Retail Price:  January
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Figure 3B:  Change in Retail Price:  October
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Prices retail price 1.67 0.12 1.78 0.14
log(retail price) 0.51 0.07 0.57 0.08
wholesale price 1.08 0.06 1.12 0.08
log(wholesale price) 0.07 0.05 0.11 0.07
ZIP Code population 19221 13312 21121 15005
Characteristics area (square miles) 73.78 61.08 69.80 76.16
gas stations 9.76 7.04 9.75 7.21
income 41515 9776 43027 12431
Race white 0.89 0.12 0.87 0.18
black 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.16
Hispanic 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04
Age age 0-18 0.27 0.03 0.26 0.04
age 19-34 0.21 0.06 0.21 0.06
age 35-64 0.38 0.04 0.39 0.04
age 65+ 0.14 0.04 0.14 0.04
Education less than high school 0.18 0.07 0.16 0.07
high school 0.37 0.08 0.35 0.09
some college 0.27 0.04 0.28 0.05
college 0.19 0.11 0.21 0.12
Commuting drive alone 0.82 0.05 0.82 0.07
car pool 0.11 0.03 0.10 0.04
public transport 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
other transport 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
work at home 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02
0-10 minutes 0.23 0.09 0.22 0.10
10-20 minutes 0.33 0.10 0.32 0.10
20-30 minutes 0.19 0.08 0.20 0.07
30-45 minutes 0.15 0.07 0.16 0.07
45-60 minutes 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04
60+ minutes 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03
Neighboring states:  MI, OH, MO, IA, WI.  Prices observed June 27, June 28, July 5, & July 6
5945 Illinois observations; 23488 Neighboring State observations.
Illinois & Indiana Neighboring States
Table 1:  Selected Summary Statistics:  July 2000
A:   July Tax Repeal
Dependent Variable: Log(Wholesale Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Illinois or Indiana -0.048 -0.013 -0.014 -0.035
(0.038) (0.025) (0.021) (0.017)
Post July 1 -0.052 0.029 0.025 -0.088
(0.007) (0.013) (0.015) (0.006)
(IL or IN)*Post July 1 -0.035 -0.029 -0.029 -0.007
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Observations 29675 29675 29433 29433
R-Squared 0.23 0.60 0.64 0.57
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.560 0.560 0.560 0.560
B:   October Tax Reinstatement
Dependent Variable: Log(Wholesale Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Indiana -0.056 -0.052 -0.053 -0.015
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001)
Post Oct. 31 -0.014 -0.008 -0.009 -0.021
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
IN*Post Oct. 31 0.039 0.040 0.040 -0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002)
Observations 22092 22092 21884 21884
R-Squared 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.41
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.457 0.457 0.456 0.456
C:   January Tax Reinstatement
Dependent Variable: Log(Wholesale Price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Illinois 0.019 -0.001 -0.005 0.029
(0.035) (0.024) (0.021) (0.007)
Post Jan. 1 -0.000 -0.038 -0.020 0.051
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
IL*Post Jan. 1 0.027 0.036 0.037 -0.014
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 7090 7090 7071 7071
R-Squared 0.04 0.24 0.39 0.41
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.303 0.303 0.303 0.303
Controls:
   Wholesale Price No Yes Yes -
    ZIP Codes Characteristics No No Yes Yes
Panel A: Prices observed June 27, June 28, July 5, July 6;  Panel B: Prices observed Oct. 26, Oct. 27, Oct. 31, Nov. 1
Panel C: Prices observed Dec. 29, Dec. 30, Jan. 2, Jan. 3.  Standard errors are reported, clustered at the state level.
                    Log(Retail Price)                    
Table 2:  Regression Results 
                    Log(Retail Price)                    
                    Log(Retail Price)                    
Dependent Variable: 
(1) (2) (3)
Time Period July Repeal Oct. Reinstatement Jan. Reinstatement
IL/IN*Post -0.035 0.032 0.028
(0.012) (0.009) (0.006)
IL/IN*Post*1(>=30min & <60min) -0.007 0.001 0.009
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004)
IL/IN*Post*1(>=60min & <90min) -0.001 0.012 0.053
(0.007) (0.002) (0.009)
IL/IN*Post*1(>=90min) 0.011 0.011 -0.012
(0.010) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 29433 21884 7071
R-Squared 0.66 0.28 0.42
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.560 0.456 0.303
Column(1): Neighboring states:  MI, OH, MO, IA, WI & Prices observed June 27, June 28, July 5, July 6
Column(2):  Neighboring states:  MI, OH, IL & Prices observed Oct. 26, Oct. 27, Oct. 31, Nov. 1
Column(3):  Neighboring states:  MO, IA, WI, IN & Prices observed Dec. 29, Dec. 30, Jan. 2, Jan. 3.
All models include full controls.  Standard errors are reported, clustered at the state level.
Table 3:  Distance to Border
Log(Retail Price)
A:   July Tax Repeal (IL/IN Border)
Dependent Variable: 
(1) (2) (3)
Chicago MSA Other Border MSAs <30 Minutes
Illinois or Indiana 0.066 0.028 0.009
(0.001) (0.010) (0.016)
Post July 1 -0.027 -0.028 -0.023
(0.001) (0.006) (0.009)
(IL or IN)*Post July 1 -0.027 -0.036 -0.056
(0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
Observations 4037 2900 1858
R-Squared 0.73 0.79 0.80
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.640 0.496 0.506
B:   October Tax Reinstatement (IN Border)
Dependent Variable: 
(1) (2) (3)
Chicago MSA Other Border MSAs <30 Minutes
Indiana -0.050 -0.049 -0.043
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Post Oct. 31 0.023 -0.013 -0.007
(0.001) (0.000) (0.007)
IN*Post Oct. 31 0.001 0.042 0.031
(0.001) (0.000) (0.008)
Observations 4040 1251 1047
R-Squared 0.65 0.45 0.61
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.453 0.460 0.449
C:   January Tax Reinstatement (IL Border)
Dependent Variable: 
(1) (2) (3)
Chicago MSA Other Border MSAs <30 Minutes
Illinois 0.047 0.037 0.023
(0.019) (0.008) (0.010)
Post Jan. 1 0.001 0.019 0.012
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
IL*Post Jan. 1 0.027 0.015 0.013
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 2449 1098 692
R-Squared 0.75 0.54 0.63
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.394 0.257 0.267
MSA Fixed Effects No Yes No
IL/IN Border ZIP Fixed Effects No No Yes
Panel A: Neighboring states:  MI, OH, MO, IA, WI & Prices observed 6/27, 6/28, 7/5, 7/6
Panel B:  Neighboring states:  MI, OH, IL & Prices observed 10/26, 10/27, 10/31, 11/1
Panel C:  Neighboring states:  MO, IA, WI, IN & Prices observed 12/29, 12/30, 1/2, 1/3
Column (3):  Stations closest to KY excluded.
All models include full controls.  Standard errors are reported, clustered at the state level.
Log(Retail Price)
Table 4:  Border Fixed Effects
Log(Retail Price)
Log(Retail Price)
Dependent Variable: 
A.  Interaction with Number of Stations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
July Repeal Oct. Reinstatement Jan. Reinstatement July Repeal Oct. Reinstatement Jan. Reinstatement
IL/IN*Post*log(Number of Stations) 0.0050 0.0038 -0.0010 .0044 .0031 .0072
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0017)
Observations 25324 19797 6665 29765 21884 7071
R-Squared 0.66 0.26 0.47 0.62 0.28 0.41
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.558 0.455 0.302 0.560 0.456 0.303
B.  Interaction with Number of Station Quartiles
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
July Repeal Oct. Reinstatement Jan. Reinstatement July Repeal Oct. Reinstatement Jan. Reinstatement
IL/IN*Post -0.032 0.031 0.044 -0.031 0.039 0.039
(0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
IL/IN*Post*Number of Stations 2nd Quartile -0.005 0.010 0.015 0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
IL/IN*Post*Number of Stations 3nd Quartile 0.003 0.020 0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.017
(0.006) (0.009) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
IL/IN*Post*Number of Stations Top Quartile 0.029 0.032 -0.019 0.003 0.005 -0.006
(0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 25324 19797 6665 29433 21884 7071
R-Squared 0.66 0.27 0.50 0.64 0.28 0.41
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.558 0.455 0.302 0.560 0.456 0.303
Column(1): Neighboring states:  MI, OH, MO, IA, WI & Prices observed June 27, June 28, July 5, July 6
Column(2):  Neighboring states:  MI, OH, IL & Prices observed Oct. 26, Oct. 27, Oct. 31, Nov. 1
Column(3):  Neighboring states:  MO, IA, WI, IN & Prices observed Dec. 29, Dec. 30, Jan. 2, Jan. 3.
All models include full controls.  Standard errors are reported, clustered at the state level.
Table 5:  Number of Gas Stations in the same MSA or ZIP Code
MSA Level ZIP code Level
Log(Retail Price)
A:   July Tax Repeal
Dependent Variable: 
(1) (2) (3)
S.E. Corrected Timeperiod: Include 
for Spatial Autocorrelation +/- 1 Month Chicago & KY
Illinois or Indiana -0.013 -0.026 -0.002
(0.014) (0.028) (0.018)
Post July 1 0.029 -0.005 0.025
(0.010) (0.013) (0.011)
(IL or IN)*Post July 1 -0.029 -0.033 -0.025
(0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
Observations 29675 351112 36689
R-Squared 0.60 0.75 0.65
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.560 0.497 0.561
B:   October Tax Reinstatement
Dependent Variable: 
(1) (2) (3)
S.E. Corrected Timeperiod: Include 
for Spatial Autocorrelation +/- 1 Month Chicago & KY
Indiana -0.052 -0.047 -0.042
(0.0002) (0.029) (0.014)
Post Oct. 31 -0.008 -0.098 -0.001
(0.00005) (0.032) (0.009)
IN*Post Oct. 31 0.040 0.032 0.032
(0.0002) (0.033) (0.010)
Observations 21890 240473 29468
R-Squared 0.18 0.39 0.23
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.457 0.412 0.448
C:   January Tax Reinstatement
Dependent Variable: 
(1) (2) (3)
S.E. Corrected Timeperiod: Include 
for Spatial Autocorrelation +/- 1 Month Chicago
Illinois -0.001 -0.016 0.011
(0.017) (0.019) (0.021)
Post Jan. 1 -0.038 -0.015 -0.020
(0.007) (0.009) (0.004)
IL*Post Jan. 1 0.036 0.042 0.033
(0.006) (0.008) (0.003)
Observations 7090 153951 11086
R-Squared 0.24 0.45 0.55
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.303 0.344 0.319
All Models include full controls, except Column(1), which includes log(wholesale price) only.  
Neighboring states:  Columns (1) & (2) as in previous tables; Column (3), includes KY for July and November.
Column (2):  Data observed one month before and one month after tax change and models include 
   quadratic trend terms allowed to vary by comparison group before and after the policy change.
Standard errors are reported, clustered at the state level, except Column (1).
Table 6:  Specification Checks
Log(Retail Price)
Log(Retail Price)
Log(Retail Price)
Dependent Variable: 
(1) (2) (3)
Time Period July Repeal Oct. Reinstatement Jan. Reinstatement
Location & Time Illinois or Indiana -0.014 -0.053** -0.005
(0.020) (0.007) (0.021)
Post Reform 0.025 -0.009 -0.020**
(0.015) (0.006) (0.004)
(IL or IN)*Post Reform -0.029** 0.040** 0.037**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.004)
Price log(wholesale price) 0.891** 0.265 0.623**
(0.142) (0.098) (0.099)
ZIP Code population  -2.33e-07 -9.71e-08 2.26e-08
Characteristics (1.99e-07) (2.15e-07) (2.44e-07)
area (square miles)  2.77e-05 6.65e-05 1.04e-05
(2.49e-05) (2.29e-05) (5.17e-05)
gas stations -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.0004)
income 8.96e-07* 0.000 6.92e-07
(3.14e-07) (0.000) (4.04e-07)
Race black 0.020 -0.004 -0.006
  excluded: white (0.025) (0.010) (0.030)
Hispanic 0.088** -0.036* 0.066
(0.023) (0.006) (0.081)
Age age 19-34 0.057 0.003 -0.005
excluded: age 0-18 (0.041) (0.022) (0.095)
age 35-64 0.124 0.041 0.100
(0.056) (0.042) (0.060)
age 65+ 0.088 -0.050 -0.116
(0.045) (0.031) (0.116)
Education high school 0.057 -0.004 0.386*
  excluded: HS drop out (0.145) (0.064) (0.109)
some college 0.116 0.009 0.191
(0.068) (0.032) (0.162)
college -0.002 0.046 0.208*
Commuting (0.070) (0.038) (0.061)
  excluded: drive alone, car pool 0.087* 0.114** 0.154
  work at home (0.028) (0.016) (0.062)
  and 0-10 minutes public transport 0.251 0.046 0.305
(0.130) (0.112) (0.212)
other transport 0.168 0.070 0.249
(0.071) (0.052) (0.103)
10-20 minutes -0.092 -0.010 -0.124
(0.041) (0.031) (0.044)
20-30 minutes -0.088* 0.003 -0.082
(0.030) (0.035) (0.046)
30-45 minutes -0.103 0.012 -0.226*
(0.066) (0.019) (0.072)
45-60 minutes -0.141 0.005 -0.281
(0.064) (0.051) (0.113)
60+ minutes -0.057 0.047 -0.020
(0.077) (0.051) (0.081)
Observations 29433 21884 7071
R-Squared 0.64 0.26 0.39
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.560 0.456 0.303
Column (1): Prices observed June 27, June 28, July 5, July 6;  Column (2): Prices observed Oct. 27, Oct. 31, Nov. 1, Nov. 2;
Column (3): Prices observed Dec. 29, Dec. 30, Jan. 2, Jan. 3.  Standard errors are reported, clustered at the state level.
Models also include indicators for major brands.  *=significant at 5%, **=significant at 1%.
Log(Retail Price)
Table A1:  Full Regression Results
A:   July Tax Repeal
Dependent Variable: 
(1) (2) (3)
Time Period July Repeal Nov. Re-Instatement Jan. Re-Instatement
IL/IN*1(t-10) 0.009 -0.000 0.025
(0.031) (0.016) (0.010)
IL/IN*1(t-9) 0.012 0.002 0.020
(0.032) (0.008) (0.013)
IL/IN*1(t-8) 0.013 0.002 0.005
(0.030) (0.009) (0.009)
IL/IN*1(t-7) 0.003 -0.000 -0.000
(0.025) (0.009) (0.008)
IL/IN*1(t-6) 0.002 0.000 0.003
(0.025) (0.010) (0.007)
IL/IN*1(t-5) 0.006 0.003 0.006
(0.020) (0.010) (0.007)
IL/IN*1(t-4) 0.002 -0.003 0.004
(0.016) (0.002) (0.007)
IL/IN*1(t-3) 0.003 0.001 0.007
(0.012) (0.003) (0.006)
IL/IN*1(t-2) 0.007 -0.002 0.009
(0.008) (0.002) (0.006)
IL/IN*Post -0.022** 0.037** 0.046**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
IL/IN*1(t+2) -0.008 0.006 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006)
IL/IN*1(t+3) -0.003 0.006 -0.016
(0.005) (0.003) (0.012)
IL/IN*1(t+4) -0.005 0.001 -0.016
(0.005) (0.006) (0.018)
IL/IN*1(t+5) 0.007 0.003 -0.020
(0.007) (0.007) (0.014)
IL/IN*1(t+6) 0.002 -0.005 -0.019
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
IL/IN*1(t+7) 0.003 -0.000 -0.022*
(0.009) (0.014) (0.008)
IL/IN*1(t+8) 0.006 0.010* -0.030**
(0.009) (0.003) (0.002)
IL/IN*1(t+9) 0.005 -0.032** -0.025**
(0.012) (0.003) (0.002)
IL/IN*1(t+10) 0.005 -0.033** -0.032*
(0.011) (0.002) (0.010)
Observations 168942 113678 47688
R-Squared 0.75 0.37 0.46
Mean of Dep. Var. 0.544 0.432 0.320
Omitted category is the day before the reform and the post reform coefficients represent the difference from the day after the reform.
Column(1): Neighboring states:  MI, OH, MO, IA, WI 
  Prices observed 6/14,6/15,6/16,6/19,6/20,6/21,6/22,6/23,6/27,6/28,7/5,7/6,7/7,7/8,7/11,7/12,7/13,7/14,7/15,7/18
  Prices observed 10/16,10/17,10/18,10/19,10/20,10/23,10/24,10/25,10/26,10/27,10/31,11/1,11/2,11/3,11/6,11/7,11/10,11/13,11/14,11/15
Column(3):  Neighboring states:  MO, IA, WI, IN & Prices observed Dec. 29, Dec. 30, Jan. 2, Jan. 3.
  Prices observed 12/19,12/20,12/21,12/22,12/23,12/24,12/25,12/26,12/29,12/30,1/2,1/3,1/4,1/5,1/6,1/7,1/8,1/9,1/10,1/11
All models include full controls including main effects of the time indicators.  Standard errors are reported, clustered at the state level.   
*=significant at 5%, **=significant at 1%.
Table A2:  Expaned Timeframe
Log(Retail Price)
Column(2):  Neighboring states:  MI, OH, IL & Prices observed Oct. 27, Oct. 31, Nov. 1, Nov. 2
